Are currency crises caused by irresponsible macroeconomic policies? The answer used to be an unqualified yes: a currency crisis was a just retribution for government mismanagement. However, the 1997 crisis in Asia has led many observers to question this view. Most of the afflicted economies had budget surpluses and healthy foreign exchange reserves. While current account deficits were large in some countries (Thailand and Malaysia), they were very modest in others (Korea and Indonesia). Thus it is difficult to argue that currency depreciations were needed because of macroeconomic reasons.1.
Recently, a literature that places the corporate sector and its leverage as the central issue in currency crises, has started to emerge. Most influential among those papers have been models by Aghion et al. (2001) and Krugman (1999) . In those papers, firms' output prices are sticky and firms have financed their operations at least partially with debt denominated in a foreign currency. When shocks or loss of confidence cause an initial currency depreciation, then declining profitability and financial distress problems for corporations lead to further depreciations. Hence, in these models a currency depreciation causes financial distress problems. The opposite view of currency depreciations is given by Bris and Koskinen (2001) . In their model, exporting companies face a financial distress problem, which is solved through a currency depreciation. A currency depreciation helps to solve financial distress problems even when firms have borrowed in a foreign currency, if firms' cashflows are denominated in a foreign currency and costs at least partially in a domestic currency. A currency depreciation is not, however, costless, since it leads to excessive leverage and risky investments prior to a depreciation.
To what extent corporate financial policies are related to exchange rate shocks is still an open question empirically. A currency depreciation may harm corporations that are financed with foreign debt, as Aghion et al. (2001) and Krugman (1999) note, and financial distress will be a consequence of the currency crisis.
If instead corporations see a potential currency depreciation as a means of resolving corporate distress problems, two main empirical predictions ensue: financial distress precedes a currency crises, and only those firms that benefit from the currency depreciation should display excessive leverage. This paper contributes to this growing literature of corporate leverage and currency crises by providing empirical evidence of corporations' financial policies and performance around currency depreciations. We analyze micro level data from 17 countries from Southeast Asia, Europe, and Latin America, that have had fixed exchange rates and have experienced devaluations over the past decade. As a control sample, we also analyze data from three countries -Argentina, Hong Kong, and Japan, that either had a currency board or a floating exchange rate regime. First we sort companies into two groups using individual companies' stock market returns. In the first group we have companies whose stock returns decrease when the domestic currency appreciates with respect to the US dollar (negative exposure companies), and in the second group those companies whose stock returns increase (positive exposure companies).
After sorting the companies into these two groups, we show that those companies with negative exposure have higher leverage than those companies that have positive exposure, even tough all companies increase their leverage prior to a currency depreciation. In addition, we analyze companies profitability and financial fragility using several standard ratios, and show that profitability decreases for all companies before a currency crisis, but the effect is more pronounced for the negative exposure companies. Also negative exposure companies in particular become more fragile financially before a currency depreciation. In addition, we show, in a multivariate regression framework controlling for firm and country characteristics, that companies that benefit from a currency depreciation have higher leverage than companies that are harmed by the depreciation. Interestingly, the results are almost the opposite for the control sample in all respects: in general, positive exposure companies fare worse than negative exposure companies in our control sample. Finally, we also examine how firms' leverage affects the amount of currency depreciations.
We find that it is especially the leverage of negative exposure companies and budget deficits that affect the magnitude of currency depreciations.
There are several other papers that depart from the traditional macroeconomic reasoning in explaining currency crises. Corsetti et al. (1998a Corsetti et al. ( , 1998b Corsetti et al. ( , 1999 argue that creditors' capital was at least implicitly guaranteed in some Asian countries, if financial difficulties were to arise. This would naturally lead to overinvestment in risky projects at the expense of safer ones. Chang and Velasco (1998a, 1998b ) model a currency crisis in the same way as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model a bank run. With foreign borrowing and a fixed exchange rate, a run on banks becomes a run on the currency. In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) outflow of capital can lead to domestic fire sales, because a country has a lack of international collateral, thus deepening a capital account crisis to a full financial crisis. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that currency crises can serve as a risk sharing mechanism between domestic bank depositors and international bond markets.
In addition to these financial distress models, Johnson et al. (2000) emphasize problems in corporate governance as an explanation to the Asian crisis and show that lack of outside investor protection is related to the amount of depreciation in emerging markets. We obtain results consistent with Johnson et al. (2000) , and we are able to provide an alternative explanation for these findings: poor corporate governance mechanisms lead to forced debt financing and thus, through high leverage, ultimately to currency depreciations. 1 The next section of the paper describes the data and its sources. In Section II we analyze the stock price reaction of the companies in our sample to a currency depreciation, based on our measures of exchange rate exposure. In Section III we study the relationship between leverage and exchange rates. In Section IV we relate exchange rate exposure to several different measures of profitability. In Section V we provide cross-sectional evidence on the determinants of capital structure and the severity of currency depreciations.
Section VI concludes the paper.
I Data

A Sample description
Throughout the paper, we define a currency crisis as the event in which a either a government or a central bank decides to let its previously fixed currency float or administratively devalues it. For our crisis sample that experienced a currency depreciation, we consider currencies that were broadly speaking fixed, hence currencies that were floating within a band and experienced a change of a band are also included. Crawling peg currencies are also considered fixed for our purposes, since we consider both nominal and real bands.
We obtain information about currency crises that have occurred in the period 1985-2000. These are partly compiled in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) . Additionally, Italy, the United Kingdom and the countries that experienced the Asian crises of 1997 are also included in the sample. When a country has suffered several crises in the period 1985-2000 (this is the case, for instance, for Brazil, Chile, Spain, and Turkey), exclusively the last one is considered. The final sample of crises includes seventeen countries, and its description is in Table I . There have been other major currency depreciations not included in the final sample for a variety of reasons. For example, we do not include the Russian crisis in 1998 because of a lack of data on Russian firms. We also eliminate Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Peru, and Uruguay, because we lack stock price data before the crises. For some countries the most recent crisis has not been considered due to the unavailability of data after the crisis 2 . Brazil, for instance, suffered its last crisis in 1999. In addition, we include three countries as a control sample: Argentina, Hong Kong and Japan. Argentina 3 and Hong Kong 4 had a currency board and both countries experienced attacks on its currency, but neither country changed its exchange rate policy. Japan 5 , that experienced a considerable depreciation, did not have a system of fixed exchange rates prior to the crisis.
For each country in the sample, Datastream provides a Global Market Index, that includes a varying number of firms per country 6 . Datastream also provides accounting information regarding all the available firms in the corresponding market, for a window of five years around the year of the currency crisis.
We are able to find information in Datastream for firms from the 20 countries we consider, 4.662 firms in our crisis sample and 2,119 firms in our control sample. Among those, 4,376 firms are from Asia 7 , 2,255 from Europe, and 150 firms from Latin America. We compare the number of firms in our sample with the total number of firms in the corresponding exchange as of December of the corresponding crisis year, from the International Federation of Stock Exchanges. On average, our sample contains 65.20 percent of all the firms listed in a country's main stock exchange. This percentage is lower for Latin American countries, where currency depreciations happened earlier and hence the lack of data problem is more severe.
[Insert Table IA] In Table IA , we calculate the domestic stock market return at the time of the currency depreciation, as well as in the five months that surround the crisis. On average stock prices decline 3.39% during the crisis month. We also calculate the currency depreciation relative to the US dollar 8 . At the same time, the average currency depreciation in our sample amounts to 24.90 percent in the 5 months that surround the crisis. The largest depreciation happened in Brazil (94.7 percent), the lowest in Venezuela (3.56 percent appreciation in five months). The median debt-to-value ratio (book values) for the total sample is 36.71 percent, with Finland having the highest ratio (57.98 percent), and Philippines the lowest (12.77 percent).
By regions, Asian countries display the highest debt levels, with a median leverage of 38.90 percent.
European countries had a 29.53 percent debt ratio and the median for Latin America is 28.66 percent.
Table IB describes the exchange rate regimes for the countries in our sample. Strictly speaking, only Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines had fixed exchange rates prior to their currency devaluations. In addition to the countries in the ERM, Finland, Norway and Sweden maintained their exchange rates within a band with respect to the ECU. Other countries (South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, and Taiwan) fixed their real exchange rates with respect to either the dollar or a basket of currencies. Malaysia and Venezuela allowed for fluctuations with respect to the dollar. Figure 1 shows that, although pegged to the dollar, Latin American currencies were the ones that fluctuated the most before the crises. Brazil pegged the real only six months before its last devaluation, and Mexico suffered several crises before the ones we consider in this paper. Asian exchange rates are not excessively volatile in the last six years before the crises (the standard deviation of the monthly change in exchange rates is 0.84 percent in Asia, 1.54 percent in Europe, and 5.52 in Latin America).
[Insert Table IB] [Insert Figure 1] In the next section we survey the literature on exchange rate exposure and propose a new methodology that allows us to differentiate firms depending on whether they benefit from or are harmed by currency depreciations. We regress the stock return of every firm on exchange rate changes and the component of the domestic market return that is orthogonal to the changes in the exchange rate.
II Exchange rate exposure
For the past twenty years, financial researchers have paid a great deal of attention to how to measure a firm's exposure to exchange rate movements. The basic models can be grouped into two categories:
accounting-based exposure and stock price-based exposure. The studies by Claessens et al. (1998) and Allayannis (1996) belong to the first group. They respectively use the percentage of exports on sales, and the ratio of net exports to sales as a measure of a firm's exposure to currency risk. In our framework, however, we encounter three problems with this methodology: first, as Allayannis et al. (2000) show, exporting firms were the ones that hedged the most prior to the Asian crises of 1997. This means that the percentage of exports is not a good measure of exchange rate exposure for Asian countries. The second problem is lack of data. The number of firms for which data on exports is available is reduced in emerging markets 9 . Finally, it is possible that a firm that only operates in the domestic market is nonetheless exposed to exchange rate risk, if competitors are foreign firms that sell to the country where the domestic firm operates 10 . Therefore, movements in the exchange rate affect the competitiveness of the domestic firm and therefore its profits.
Among the studies that focus on stock price -based exposure, Jorion (1990 Jorion ( , 1991 , Bodnar and Gentry (1993) , and Amihud (1994) regress a company's stock return on exchange rate changes and additional control variables such as a market portfolio return 11 . Jorion (1991) uses a two-factor model, with the value-weighted stock market return as the first factor and the orthogonal component of innovations in a trade-weighted exchange rate as the second factor. The orthogonalization eliminates spurious pricing of the exchange rate factor because of a possible correlation between exchange rate and market return.
Finally, Bodnar and Wong (2000) suggest that the inclusion of a market portfolio increases the precision of the residual exposure estimates. However, if the market portfolio has a non-zero exposure, including a market portfolio as a regressor shifts the distribution of the residual exposure estimates with respect to the total exposure counterparts. Therefore residual exposure estimates reflect the deviation of the firm's exposure from the market's portfolio exposure. As most studies use a value-weighted portfolio, dominated by large firms with a more negative exposure to exchange rate movements, the residual exposure estimates suffer from a positive shift. The solution the authors suggest is the use of an equal-weight market portfolio to correct for the correlation between firm size and the sign of the exchange rate exposure.
.1 An alternative approach
We measure the exchange rate exposure by partly following the methodology in Jorion (1991). However, our procedure is exactly the opposite of Jorion's: in explaining individual companies' stock returns, we use as regressors the change in exchange rate and the component of market return that is orthogonal to the change in exchange rate. This methodology circumvents the critique made by Bodnar and Wong (2000) . We measure exposure in absolute sense, not relative to the market as a whole. In order to avoid non-synchronous movements in exchange rates and stock returns, we use monthly data.
First we estimate the following regression for each country in our sample:
where R j mt is the market return, and R j xt is the change in the exchange rate in country j. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = −72 to month t = −37 relative to the currency depreciation month 12 . Next, we calculate
) from the previous regression, and use the estimated orthogonal component of market return in the regression:
where R ij is the stock return of firm i in country j, R j x is the monthly change in the exchange rate in country j, and F j m is the estimated orthogonal component for market j. The estimated β x i are, as stated, measures of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk. We could have simply regressed the individual stock returns R ij on the changes in the exchange rate R j x . This simple regression results in less precise exchange rate risk estimates, though. 13
In Table II we show for each country the average exchange rate beta and the orthogonal market beta, as well as each individual market exposure coefficient to exchange rate movements, following the methodology outlined above. The average exchange rate beta is the size-weighted average of the exchange rate betas calculated for the firms in a particular country. The market exposure is, for every country, the estimate of
Ten countries in our crisis sample have a negative exchange rate exposure. All European countries, except Turkey, have a negative value for γ 1 , whereas in all Asian countries, except for the Philippines and Thailand, γ 1 is positive. In Thailand, for instance, the country exposure is −7.042 . Indonesia, in the other extreme, displays a country exposure of 4.607. In our matching sample, Argentina and Hong Kong have negative country exposures.
[Insert Table II] We expect exporting firms to display a negative exchange rate beta, while domestic firms should have a positive exposure. Seoul Foods, for instance, a South Korean firm that manufactures bread and snack foods (arguably a non-exporting firm) has a beta of 2.509. An exporting firm such as Shin Corporation 14 , from Taiwan, has a beta of −7.5041. The results for the average market betas are consistent with Bodnar and Wong (2000), since we find markets to be exposed to currency movements.
Therefore, and in the absence of data on the structure of the balance sheet for each firm, we are able to characterize every firm in the sample into two categories depending on its exposure to exchange rate movements: firms that benefit from currency depreciations, and firms that suffer from depreciations. It is worth noting that exporting firms may have an insignificant exchange rate beta if they hedge their currency exposure.
We rank firms in a particular country by their exchange rate beta. Firms are not comparable in terms of exchange rate exposure across countries. Therefore we rank each firm with respect to the other companies in the same country by splitting the sample between firms with negative and positive exchange rate beta.
In the next sections, we analyze the stock price reaction to a currency crisis, and the different effects of the currency depreciation on firms depending on whether the firm has negative or positive exposure to currency movements.
III Stock price effects
A good test of the outlined methodology is to analyze stock price effects around the currency depreciation for firms with positive and negative exchange rate beta. One expects firms with negative exchange rate beta to react positively to a currency depreciation, since their revenues increase (either because they are exporting firms, or because their competitors have an opposite exposure to the exchange rate).
We follow the standard procedure of estimating
, where b α i and b β m i are the estimates in the regression
The estimation is performed for a window running from t = −72 to t = −36 months relative to the depreciation month for each country. Results are reported in Table III , where we display cumulative abnormal returns for different subperiods around the crises.
For the crisis sample (2.980 firms), the average announcement return (two months around the date of the currency depreciation) is 7.27 percent, significantly different from zero at the one percent level. For the matching sample, the announcement return is −4.71 percent, also significantly different from zero at one percent level. Across regions, the average CAR from t = −1 to t = +1 is 0.82 percent in European countries (insignificant), 10.41 percent for the Asian economies, and −4.88 percent for Latin America; with the last two coefficients significant at the 1 percent level 15 . When we split the sample into two groups depending on firms' exchange rate exposure, we find that negative exposure firms have a positive announcement return (7.73% for the overall crisis sample, significant at the one percent level), that is larger than the announcement CAR for the positive exposure firms (5.62%, significant at the one percent level). The same pattern is true for the subsample of Asian firms. This confirms that a currency depreciation is good news especially for negative exposure firms. Interestingly, in the matching sample, both positive and negative exposure firms have a negative announcement return.
[Insert Table III] Immediately prior to the currency crises, we document negative CARs on average. While the average CAR from t = −36 to t = −13 is 6.60 percent across regions, it is −9.62 percent from t = −12 to t = −2.
The CARs are more negative for positive exposure firms in Europe, Latin America, and the matching sample. In fact, negative exposure firms in Europe have a positive CAR (2.95%, significant at the ten percent level) from t = −12 to t = −2. This is quite interesting taking into account that profitability declines more for the negative exposure firms prior to the currency depreciation 16 . After the currency crises, the average CAR for the whole sample is positive (58.96% from t = 2 to t = 36). Moreover, the CARs are more positive for the negative exposure firms, confirming the intuition that a depreciation mostly benefits exporting firms.
IV Firm leverage and exchange rate exposure
In this section we report debt-to-value ratios, as a measure of leverage, for all the firms in our sample. 17 The debt-to-value ratio is analyzed for the last two years preceding the currency devaluation, as well as for two years after the devaluation. For each firm, we gather data on its total debt-to-value ratio from Datastream;
as well as on the percentage of short-term debt to total debt. Both ratios are in book values. We use book values primarily because using market values would yield spurious results. For example, a decline in stock prices before a currency depreciation would imply an increase in debt-to-value ratios without any increase in the amount of debt, if market values were to be used. Furthermore, we sort firms into two groups based on their exchange rate exposure. Both Aghion et al. (2001) and Bris and Koskinen (2001) emphasize firm level indebtness as a central issue in currency crises. As analyzed in the previous sector, the announcement returns are positive for negative exposure firms and negative for positive exposure firms.
That result implies that a depreciation helps to solve financial distress problems in negative exposure firms and causes further financial distress problems for positive exposure firms. Since in Aghion et al. and Bris and Koskinen the effect of depreciation on firms financial distress problems is the opposite, it is important to establish what kind of firms increase their leverage prior to currency crises.
.
[Insert Table IV] [Insert Table IV 
The results are in Tables IV, IV Table IV we analyze changes in leverage prior to the crises; in Table IV -B we show the same results disaggregated at the country level. We find that firms that benefit from a currency depreciation (those with negative exchange rate beta) increase their debt-to-value ratios 6.01 percent in median (significant at the one percent level) in the two-year period that precedes the devaluation, while firms that suffer from a depreciation increase leverage by 2.76 percent (significant at the one percent level). The difference between negative and positive exposure firms is also significant at the one percent level. Negative exchange rate beta firms increase their leverage more than positive exchange rate beta firms in Europe (median increase 9.72 percent versus 5.09 percent), Asia (4.07 percent median increase versus 0.19 percent insignificant increase) and Latin America (4.67 percent median increase versus and insignificant decrease of 0.81 percent). The result is reversed for the matching sample, where negative exchange rate beta firms increase their leverage by an insignificant 0.54 percent and positive exchange rate beta firms by 1.72 percent. Hence, firms behave differently in the crisis sample and in the matching sample depending on their exchange rate exposure.
In the two years that follow the currency depreciation, the patterns are reversed. In the crisis sample, positive exchange rate beta firms increase their leverage significantly more than negative exchange rate beta firms (9.82 percent for negative exposure firms and 27.64 percent for positive exposure firms). In the subsample, the same phenomenon can be seen for European and Asian firms: the leverage increases more for the positive exposure firms. For the matching sample, the opposite holds: the negative exchange rate beta firms increase their leverage in the two years following the crises.
On country level, we find that firms in Finland, UK, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, [Insert Table V] We also analyze the changes in short-term debt ratios to total debt, where short-term is defined as a maturity of less than one year. Results are in Table V . For the overall crisis sample, the median short-term debt to total debt ratio does not change significantly around the currency depreciation. This holds for both negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. In Europe, however, negative exposure firms increase their short-term debt ratios prior to a currency depreciation and then decrease the same ratio after the currency depreciation (6.43 percent increase in the proportion of short-term debt and then 5.65 percent decrease after the depreciation).
Our results concerning the increase in leverage are consistent with Pomerleano (1998), Harvey and Roper (1999), and Claessens et al. (1998) . However, these authors also document significant increases in short-term debt. Pomerleano (1998) documents the rapidly increasing debt ratios in Asia, specially shortterm, from 1992 to 1996. However, he does not provide a disaggregated analysis by firm characteristics. Harvey and Roper (1999) report that the median leverage ratio across the 261 firms in their sample was 68.6 percent in 1992, and 114 percent in 1996. The leverage increase was mostly short-term again. In Claessens et al. (1998) , Asian firms also display increasing debt ratios, and their data suggest that the ratio of short term debt to total debt in the Asian economies was significantly larger than in the US or Germany (the median short-term debt share increases from 47.26 percent in 1988 to 60.43 percent in 1996; this ratio is 25.9 percent in 1996 in the US, 45.3 percent in Germany).
In general, these results confirm that fixed exchange rate economies display increasing corporate leverage prior to a currency depreciation, particularly among companies that benefit from currency depreciations.
The increase in leverage is not due to relatively higher increase in short-term borrowing. Return on Capital Employed in Pomerleano, 1998). We want to examine whether this result extends to other regions and whether it is uniform across firms with different exposure to exchange rate movements.
[Insert Table VI ] We obtain data on two measures of profitability (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes over Total Revenues, and Return on Capital Employed). Results are in Tables VI and VII. We do find significant declines in profitability under both measures and in the three regions under consideration for our crisis sample. For the overall crisis sample, the EBIT to revenues ratio decreases by 1.72 percent in the two years prior to a currency depreciation. This median decline is more severe for negative exposure firms (−2.35 percent for negative exposure firms compared to −0.92 percent for positive exposure firms, significantly different at the 1 per cent level). This result carries over to different regions: in Europe, Asia and Latin America the firms that have negative exchange rate betas have a bigger decrease in median profitability (the difference is significant at least at the 5 percent level). In the matching sample, we do not observe any decline in EBIT to revenues ratio in the two years prior to a crisis; on the contrary, we see a small increase (0.11 percent, significant at the 10 percent level). After the currency depreciation, profitability increases for the negative exposure firms and decreases for the positive exposure firms in Europe and Latin America.
Interestingly, this result does not hold for Asia, where EBIT to revenues ratio declines both for negative and positive exposure firms. The same results holds for our matching sample.
[Insert Table VII] The other measure of profitability we use, the Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), confirms that profitability decreases in the two years before a currency depreciation (a decrease of 3.13 percent for the overall crisis sample). Using this measure for profitability, however, we cannot find any difference between negative and positive exposure firms: both types of firm suffer from declining profitability. Again, the matching sample tells the opposite story; no decline in ROCE in the two years prior to a crisis. After currency depreciations, we cannot observe any improvement in ROCE. On the contrary, for the overall crises sample, ROCE declines even after a depreciation for both negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This result is due to adverse development in Asia after the crisis. This result is consistent with the previous result using EBIT to revenues ratio as a measure of profitability: after a currency depreciation, the profitability of all firms in Asia declines no matter what the measure. The same is true for the matching sample.
B Financial Fragility
Radelet and Sachs (1998) blame financial panic as a cause of the East Asia crises of 1997. They identify the ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves as an indicator of a country's risk. Foreign exchange reserves can trigger a crisis in the way the inability of banks to face their short-term payments creates a bank run in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . Radelet and Sachs (1998) report that this ratio was above one for Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea prior to 1997. However, it was also below one for some other countries affected by the crises, such as Taiwan and the Philippines.
We study financial fragility in a similar fashion to Radelet and Sachs (1998) , except that we use firm level data. In our analysis, the current ratio measures the ability of a creditor to pay off its short-term debts. The current ratio is calculated as current assets to current liabilities, and it reflects the current liquidity of the firm. Pomerleano (1998) argues that this would be a good measure of a firm's financial fragility, although the ratio is not reported in his study.
[Insert Table VIII] We report in Table VIII the current ratio for 2, 661 firms in our crisis sample and for 1, 263 firms in our matching sample. For the crisis sample, the current ratio falls from 1.38 to 1.33 in the two years preceding the corresponding crises (a significant 4.00 percent in median), consistent with the country level results in Radelet and Sachs (1998). We report similar numbers for our matching sample. For the US, the current ratio for the total sample of Compustat firms ( 5, 108 firms with data available) in the years 1995 through 1998 is respectively 3.29, 3.70, 4.04 and 3.34, considerably higher than either in our crisis or matching samples. The evolution of the current ratio differs somewhat across firms depending on their currency exposure. While negative ERB firms decrease their current ratio by 6.00 percent (significant at the 1 percent level), the change for positive ERB firms is −3.00 percent (also significant at the 1 percent level). The difference, however, is only marginally significant at the 10 percent level. The evidence is similar for all the regions. For the matching sample, the decline is in the current ratio is 5.00 percent for all firms. Interestingly, for two years after the crises, the current ratio still declines for Asian firms (a decline of 13.00 percent for both negative and positive exposure firms, significant at the 1 percent level).
This is further evidence that the Asian firms have been slower in their recovery compared to European and Latin American firms.
[Insert Table IX] Table IX complements the previous result. We display the interest coverage ratios for the firms in the sample, and find a clear deterioration in solvency for both negative and positive ERB firms prior to the onset of the corresponding crises. For the overall crisis sample, the interest coverage ratio decreases by 116.62 percent in the two years preceding the currency depreciation. Negative exchange rate beta firms experience a decrease of 102.00 percent in their interest coverage ratio, while firms with a positive exchange rate beta decrease their interest coverage ratio by 129.00, both coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. For European firms, the decline in interest coverage ratio is greater for negative exposure firms than for positive exposure firms (−333.69% versus 242.63%, difference significant at 5 percent level). For Asian firms, the positive ERB firms actually improve their interest coverage ratio (a increase of 11.54 percent), while the negative ERB show a decline of 9.62 percent (difference is significant at the 1 percent level). Furthermore, we should note that all Asian firms were very fragile before the onset of the crisis, with interest coverage ratios barely above 1. Also noteworthy is the observation that in our matching sample firms significantly increases their interest coverage ratios prior to the crises (an increase of 117.70 percent for all firms).
It is also interesting to note that for European and Latin American firms, the interest coverage ratio increases significantly (increases of 85.53% and 54.20%, respectively) during the two years following the currency crises, while for the Asian firms, the interest coverage ratio declines even further (a decline of 39.69
percent, significant at the 1 percent level). Analysis of the interest coverage ratio thus further confirms the special characteristics of the Asian crises with respect to the turbulences in Europe and Latin America.
C Investments
We analyze the investment policies in our sample of firms from three different regions by obtaining data on changes in total assets. We define net investments as the ratio of changes in total assets relative to total assets. In Table X we summarize changes in net investments for a period of five years.
[Insert Table X ] Overall in our crisis sample, companies invest 11.96 percent less than they did before the onset of a currency crisis. Negative exchange rate beta firms have a larger decrease than positive exchange rate beta firms (8.32 percent decline compared to 15.81 percent decline, difference significant at the 1 percent level).
We can not detect any changes in investment policies for firms in our matching sample. The difference between negative and positive exposure firms is significant in Asia, where negative ERB firms decrease their net investments by 1.57 percent and positive ERB firms by 7.63 percent. It is also interesting to note 
D Summary of the findings
Our analysis suggests that firms in countries that have suffered dramatic exchange rate depreciations in the last decade, follow a similar pattern of investment and financial policies. We have documented significant increases in leverage prior to a currency depreciation. These increases in leverage are greater for negative exposure firms in our crisis sample, whereas for the matching sample the opposite holds. We also show a decline in profitability in the corporate sector, that it is more accentuated for those firms with negative exposure to exchange rate movements. Again, the evidence for the matching sample is very different. We are able to see differences across regions: while in Europe and Latin America, the negative exposure firms improve their profitability in the two years after the crisis as expected, in Asia all firms show declining profitability. The special case of Asian crisis further manifests itself when we study firms' financial fragility:
all firms in our crisis sample become more fragile before the onset of their respective crises, but Asian firms show even greater fragility after the crisis. Although investment rates are declining for our crisis sample, companies still increase the size of their total assets. This results suggests that corporations must rely on external financing to engage in new investments. Interestingly, even tough negative exposure firms'
profitability declines more than positive exposure firms' profitability, it is especially the positive exposure firms that decrease their investments prior to a currency depreciation. This suggests that negative exposure firms take bigger risks than positive exposure firms.
In the next section we analyze first whether micro variables (the firm's exposure to exchange rates being the most important one) affect the extent of a country's currency depreciation. Then we study cross-sectionally the determinants of a firm decision to rely on debt financing when exchange rates are fixed and depreciations are possible.
VI Cross-sectional analysis A Firm leverage and currency depreciations
The argument made in Bris and Koskinen (2001) is that small, exporting countries where the corporate sector displays declining profitability, are more likely to suffer currency crises when the exchange rate is fixed and the government cannot commit ex-ante not to let the currency depreciate. Firms in these firms tend to rely heavily on debt financing, since through currency depreciation the costs of financial distress are passed on to the economy as a whole. In Aghion et al. (2001) corporate leverage is also the main factor causing currency depreciations, but contrary to Bris and Koskinen, it should be the leverage among those firms that suffer from currency depreciations that determines the severity of the crisis.
We therefore test directly the previous hypotheses by focusing on the 20 countries in our sample: the 17 countries that were forced to devalue their previously fixed exchange rates and the three control countries.
The endogenous variable in our regressions is the exchange rate change in the two months that surround the currency crisis. The magnitude of this variable is obviously negative for the countries in our sample, and lower the more severe the crisis was. Johnson et al. (2000) measure the severity of the Asian crises with the nominal exchange rate depreciation from the end of 1996 to January 1999. The countries in our sample have relatively fixed exchange rates over the sample period, so a better measure of the crises is the currency depreciation once the government support of the currency is abandoned. Secondly, using the debtto-value ratio as an explanatory variable of the currency depreciation over a long horizon creates causality problems, that we avoid by measuring the currency depreciation in a different subperiod. Finally, the amount of depreciation at t = 0 is not a good measure of the total depreciation; South Korea, for instance, let the currency float three months after the first speculative attacks against the won started (after repeated interventions by the Central Bank of Korea, South Korea abandoned its defense of the battered won on November 17, 1997). Additionally, most currencies depreciated dramatically in the months following the crisis 18 . We show the values of this variable in Table I . On average, depreciation amounts to 24.90 percent in a period of five months.
The results in the previous sections show that countries that suffered currency crises display significant increases in corporate debt-to-value ratios. We intend to analyze whether the corporate sector contributed to the severity of the crisis with high levels of leverage. We differentiate between firms with negative and positive exchange rate sensitivity by calculating the weighted average debt to equity ratio for firms in either group. That is, for every country we calculate:
and similarly:
where β i x denotes a firm's exchange rate beta, and w i is the company's average sales in the three years that precede the corresponding crisis period. Note that, within a country, the weighted average debt-to-equity ratio can be written as:
That is, we decompose the average leverage into two components: one attributable to firms with negative ERB, and the other corresponding to firms with positive ERB.
La Porta et al. (1998) (2000) find that these four measures of legal institutions predict the changes in exchange rates in emerging markets better than the standard macro measures. They report a negative relationship between these variables and the currency depreciation from 1997 to 1998 (low values for 'Corruption', and 'Risk of Expropriation' mean respectively high levels of corruption and expropriation risk). In addition, we control for the country's GDP as well. In terms of GDP, the recent currency crises have affected relatively small European countries, and large Asian and Latin American Economies.
[Insert Table XI] We provide different specifications due to the reduced number of degrees of freedom. In Panel I we only make use of capital structure and corporate governance variables. The results in Models I and II provide empirical support to our claim that the relevant factor in explaining the severity of a currency crisis is not the average debt to value ratio or the debt to value ratio of positive exposure firms, but the debt to value ratio for firms with negative exposure to exchange rate changes. Even when we control for the variables in
La Porta et al. (1998) , the average debt to value ratio is of the is only of marginally significance (Model III), whereas this parameter is always significant for negative ERB firms (at 1% level in Model II, IV and VI). The leverage of positive exposure firms is never significant.
In Panel II, we add two macroeconomic variables to our analysis, budget and current account deficits relative to the GDP, measured one year prior to the onset of the relevant crises. We observe that the average debt to value ratio now is more significant compared to specifications in Panel I (in Model VIII marginally significant, in Model X significant at the 1 percent level). Once we decompose the leverage into leverage for negative and positive ERB firms, we find that it is really the leverage of negative exposure firms that affects the amount of depreciation (significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications). Budget deficit is the other variable that is consistently significant in determining the amount of depreciation. We can thus conclude that the evidence tends to support the implications of Bris and Koskinen (2001) , but the results should be taken with a grain of salt, since the sample size in this cross-sectional regression using country level observations is so small.
B Firm leverage and currency exposure
We complete the cross-sectional analysis by testing whether firms' currency exposure measured by their exchange-rate betas affects firms' financing policies prior to a currency depreciation. If financial distress is likely to induce a government to let the currency depreciate as a way of bailing out companies, then we should expect firms that benefit the most from a currency depreciation to have a higher leverage than companies that suffer from depreciation prior to a currency crisis.
We test this by performing a regression analysis at the firm level where the explanatory variable is the firm's debt-to-value ratio (book values) as of December prior to the corresponding currency crisis. The set of explanatory variables includes the firm's exchange rate beta, calculated over a window of t = −60 to t = −24 months relative to the event month. We construct a dummy variable I i that takes value 1 if the corresponding firm i belongs to the original sample, and zero if it belongs to the matching sample. We then decompose the effect of the exchange rate beta into two groups, depending on the dummy variable. The first component equals I i β x i , that is described in Table XII as 'Exchange Rate Beta -Original Sample'.
The second component equals (1 − I i )β Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that highly levered companies are more likely to give up profitable investment opportunities. Hence, growth opportunities (using the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets as a proxy) should be negatively related to debt-to-equity ratios. We calculate the average market to book ratio in the three years preceding the currency crises for 3, 388 firms in our sample.
In Rajan and Zingales (1995) size is measured by the logarithm of sales. They obtain a positive coefficient in their regressions, although, in their view, a negative relationship between size and debt levels is sensible if size is also a proxy for the information outside investors have. Our measure of size is a three-year average of a firm's sales in the three years before the relevant currency depreciation. Additionally, they find a negative relationship between EBITDA (normalized by the book value of assets) and book debt-to-value ratios. Our measure of profitability is EBIT normalized by total assets. We further control for the log of the GDP per capita in dollars.
[Insert Table XII] The results from the regression are reported in Table XII . For the total sample, we find results consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995) , since profitability and size have respectively negative and positive coefficients in general (albeit not always significant). Contrary to Rajan and Zingales, market to book ratio is never significant in our cross-sectional regressions. Focusing on the coefficient for the exchange rate beta, we consistently find a negative relationship between a firm's exposure to exchange rate movements and book leverage for the firms in our crisis sample. The opposite holds for the firms in the matching sample. This means that negative exposure firms have higher leverage than positive exposure firms for our crisis sample, even when we control with the relevant firm characteristics. This finding is consistent with the arguments in Bris and Koskinen (2001) . We also find that the corporate governance and legal variables are often significant. Higher risk of expropriation is related to higher leverage as expected. Corruption index and efficiency of judicial system change signs depending on the specification, so these explanatory variables do not provide consistent explanations for corporate leverage.
VII Conclusion
This paper uses company level data from seventeen countries that have experienced a currency crisis during the past decade. We also include data from three control countries, whose currencies were under attack, but remained quite stable or where floating in the first place. Companies are sorted into two groups depending on whether they benefit from or are harmed by currency appreciations. The sorting is done using companies individual stock returns that are regressed on their home currency's movement against the US dollar and on the part of market return that is orthogonal to the currency movement. Using this grouping we are able to show that there are differences in companies' leverage and profitability depending on their exchange rate beta in our crisis sample. While leverage increases and profitability declines for all companies, these effects are more pronounced for negative exchange rate beta companies. We find the opposite for our matching sample. Regarding financial fragility, we find that all firms in our crisis sample become more fragile before the onset of the crisis. Interestingly, there is evidence that the Asian crisis differs from crises in Europe and Latin America: firms in Asia become even more fragile after the crises, when especially the negative exposure firms in Europe and Latin America start to recover. In a cross-sectional regression controlling for firm characteristics, we find that the firms with negative exchange rate betas have higher leverage prior to a crisis than firms that have positive exchange rate betas. Finally, the amount of currency depreciation is positively related to leverage in companies that benefit from depreciations. 2 We require six years of past information, and two years of post-crisis data, on stock prices for the firms available in the sample in order to perform the estimation. 5 The yen depreciated 7.37% in November 1997, and it was at its five-year low in November 25. The Yamaichi Bank had collapsed in November 22.
6 There are 50 stocks from Brazil, 50 from Venezuela, 90 from Mexico, 50 from Finland, 50 from Norway, 120 from Spain, 70 from Sweden, 50 from Turkey, 550 from the UK, 160 from Italy, 50 from Indonesia, 100 from South Korea, 90 from Malaysia, 50 from the Phillippines, 100 from Singapore, 70 from Taiwan, 50 from Thailand, included in each market index.
7 Pomerleano (1998), with a sample of firms that include Japan and Hong Kong, employs data from 734 companies.
8 Throughout the paper, exchange rates are calculated as units of dollars per domestic currency.
9 In their paper on the Asian crises of 1997, Allayannis et al. (2000) are able to find data on exports only for the largest 50 companies in each country.
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In the early studies of Dumas (1978) , Adler and Dumas (1984) and Hodder (1982) , exposure was measured by the regression coefficient of the real value of the firm on the exchange rate. Although these models are easy to implement, they find the percentage of firms with a significant exposure to exchange rate movements to be low.
12 Calculating market-based exchange rate exposure can be problematic for countries with currency boards. Argentina, for instance, has a currency board since 1991. We use data on Argentinian companies from 1989 to 1992 to calculate exchange rate exposures (Argentina crises happened in 1995), so firm sensitivities are calculated with pre-currency board data. Hong
Kong pegged its currency to the US dollar in 1983. However, the parity has been changing constantly since then.
13 In this paper, we only report the results we get using all of our observations. As a robustness check, we have also calculated all the results using only the observations, whose estimates of the exchange rate exposure are significant at the 10% level or lower. None of the qualitative results chnage. These results are available upon request.
14 Shiang Shin Corporation, located in Taiwan, is engaged in the manufacturing and exporting of Nitrile Gloves, Latex
Surgical Gloves, Latex Examination Gloves, Vinyl Examination Gloves and other Disposable Medical Products. Its main markets are in the U.S.A., Europe, Australia, Japan, Central & South America.
15 Additionally, the sample of European firms include a majority of firms with negative exposure to exchange rates. Bartov and Wong (2000) show that if the market portfolio has a non-zero exposure to exchange rate movements, the distribution of returns shift with respect to the total market exposure. Therefore, we expect negative CARs for European firms.
16 See table VI for the evidence.
17 Throughout the paper, we consider the debt-to-value ratio as the object of study. The results do not change qualitatively when we use the debt-to-equity ratio instead.
18 The Indonesian central bank widened the rupiah trading band from 12 percent to 8 percent in July 1997. The band was finally abandoned in August 14, and in the next two months the rupiah lost 25.35 percent with respect to the dollar. 19 We are grateful to Florencio López de Silanes for providing us with these unpublished data. 
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Philippines
The Peso fluctuated in a 15% range of 28 to 24 between 1990 and the beginning of 1995 but was practically fixed at a 26.2 rate to the US dollar from the spring of 1995 until the beginning of 1997
Sweden
Behaved as an ERM country, although not officially in the system.
Singapore
The currency actually appreciated in nominal terms throughout the 1990s going from a rate of 1.7 in 1990 to a rate of 1.4 by the end of 1996.
Italy
The exchange rate is maintained within a margin of ±15 percent around the bilateral central rates against other participating currencies, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands, in which case the exchange rate is maintained within a margin of ±2.25 percent.
Taiwan
Real exchange rate targeting allowing its currency to fall from a rate of 24 New Taiwan dollars per US$ in 1990 to a rate of 27.8 by the end of 1996.
Thailand
The Thai Bath was effectively fixed in a narrow 25.2 to 25.6 to the US$ from 1990 until 1997
Turkey
Managed floating exchange rate.
United Kingdom The exchange rate is maintained within a margin of ±15 percent around the bilateral central rates against other participating currencies, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands, in which case the exchange rate is maintained within a margin of ±2.25 percent.
Venezuela
The exchange rate is maintained within margins of ±7.5 percent. Number of firms in the sample per country, average firm exchange rate beta, and average firm market beta, for countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. The fourth column displays the country exposure coefficient to exchange rate movements. This coefficient is calculated as follows. For every country in our sample, we estimate the regression
, where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients (reported for each country) using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Exchange rate betas are calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression
, where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate β . Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test. In the last panel, we show the p-value for a test of equal medians between the original sample (i.e. firms for the 17 countries that have suffered the devaluation) and the matching sample; for the whole sample (total), and for negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This table displays the median Debt to Equity Ratio for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. 'Europe' includes firms from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 'Asia' includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 'Latin America' includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. The ratio equals Total Debt to Value (book value of equity plus debt). Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression
, where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test. In the last panel, we show the p-value for a test of equal medians between the original sample (i.e. firms for the 17 countries that have suffered the devaluation) and the matching sample; for the whole sample (total), and for negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This table displays the ratio of Short-Term Debt to Total Debt for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. 'Europe' includes firms from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 'Asia' includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 'Latin America' includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Matching Sample" includes firms from Argentina, Hong Kong, and Japan. The ratio equals Total Debt to Value (book value of equity plus debt). Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression
, where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test. In the last panel, we show the p-value for a test of equal medians between the original sample (i.e. firms for the 17 countries that have suffered the devaluation) and the matching sample; for the whole sample (total), and for negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test. In the last panel, we show the p-value for a test of equal medians between the original sample (i.e. firms for the 17 countries that have suffered the devaluation) and the matching sample; for the whole sample (total), and for negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test. In the last panel, we show the p-value for a test of equal medians between the original sample (i.e. firms for the 17 countries that have suffered the devaluation) and the matching sample; for the whole sample (total), and for negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate This table reports the results of the regression of the amount of depreciation from months t = -2 to t = +2 on the variables listed under the variables column for countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate 
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Figure 1
Exchange Rate Changes before Currency Crises The graph shows the average appreciation / depreciation of the nominal exchange rate US dollar / domestic currency in the 72 months preceding the currency crises in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela), Europe (Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom), Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), considered in the paper. 15.00%
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